Unorganized armed resistance is forming in the Houthi-controlled areas – “Exclusive investigation”

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Yemen Monitor/Reporting Unit/Exclusive:

Unorganized popular resistance against the Houthi armed group is forming in areas under their control, as the movement continues to use violence to consolidate its power. The Houthis have failed to manage state institutions or provide services to citizens, whose anger is growing day after another.

The group typically sends its top leaders to contain tribal uprisings. Mehdi Al-Mashat, the head of the group’s political council, met several times in September with tribal sheikhs from the governorates of Dhamar, Sana’a, Amran, Sa’ada, and Hajjah. In these meetings, he reiterated that their priorities are “confronting the aggression, preserving the internal front, and reforming state institutions.” However, he also threatened that “those who violate the law will be deterred by the armed forces affiliated with his group.”

“Even slaves are not treated by their masters as the Sana’a authority (Houthis) treats the Yemeni people,” wrote a prominent tribe sheikh of “Dhuhm” in Al-jawf governorate who has not yet clashed with the Houthis. However, he uses his Facebook page to criticize the group.

Unorganized Resistance Operations

On August 9, a Houthi fighter named “Hamdi Jubari” was killed by armed tribesmen, just a few days after he had killed a citizen named “Hussein Al-Muradi” in front of his wife in the Al-Radhmah district, northeast of Ibb governorate (central Yemen). Jubari had previously killed the victim’s father and uncle over a year ago, with the backing of Houthi leaders in the governorate, who faced resistance from Al-Muradi family regarding their policies in the governorate.

In the village of “Hamat Sarar,” part of the Walad Al-Rabe’e district in Al-Bayda governorate (central Yemen), tensions have been escalating since the beginning of this month following the tribesmen killing of four Houthi militants and the injury of the fifth as revenge for the killing of two villagers from the area, which falls under the Rada’a tribes. The Houthis have mobilized their forces and armored vehicles at the outskirts of the village and imposed a tight siege on it since the seventh of the month, preventing the entry of medicine and food supplies, as well as blocking residents from reaching their farms. The Houthis obliges the tribesmen of  the handing of the perpetuators who retaliated against the group’s militants.

In Al-Bayda governorate, The Houthis are suffering significantly from the tribes of  “Qifat Rada’a”. In March, a man named Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Zailai killed his brother’s murderer on a Houthi military vehicle in the city of Rada’a. He shot and killed the perpetrator and another person nearby, injuring two other of the militants. In retaliation, the Houthi militia detonated a series of homes on the heads of their residents, resulting in dozens of civilian casualties, but they have so far failed to reach Al-Zailai.

At the end of July, the tribes of the Majzar district in Marib governorate prevented the Houthis, known as “Al Shukr,” from establishing training camps and barracks in the tribal areas. Previously the Houthis took control of lands belonging to the tribe and set up camps and observation towers on it.

In Amran Governorate, in mid-July, the Houthis attempted to raid a mosque in Suwair Directorate (Manjiza village, al-Dhibah sub-district), north of Amran city, to search for a wanted individual. Tribal gunmen refused to allow them to disrupt Friday prayer, leading to clashes that resulted in the death and injury of 14 people, including women, with 7 of the casualties being Houthis. Among the dead was Hamoud Abu Saeed, a man who had repeatedly resisted the Houthis. This incident was part of a series of events that began in May when tribal gunmen killed a Houthi supervisor inside a school in the directorate. Subsequently, tribal men clashed with the Houthi leader Fahd al-Dhifani, prompting the Houthis to launch a pursuit campaign targeting the tribes of “Dhu Qazan, Dhu Zayed, and al-Mashraqi” in the directorate, claiming it was to search for the wanted individuals.

Weeks earlier, in June, gunmen from the “Ghola Ajib” tribes attacked the security headquarters in Raydah city, southeast of Amran governorate, after a Houthi leader known as “Abu Abdul Hamid” had kidnapped the tribal sheikh Hamid Qasim Awiddin and placed him in the security headquarters’ prison while he was still wounded from the kidnapping.

In Dhamar Governorate, south of Sana’a, in late July, the village of AL-Zur, belonging to the Al-Hada tribe, rejected a Houthi enforcement decision regarding a killing incident between the village and a neighboring village over grazing lands. As a result, the Houthis launched a pursuit and arrest campaign against the village’s children, elderly, and women on its outskirts, leading to clashes with the armed group, which had mobilized dozens of fighters and vehicles. Several people from both sides were killed and injured.

A Houthi officer was killed and three of his members were injured in a clash with an armed man who resisted their arrest campaign on July 8th. The Houthi Interior Ministry’s security media admitted the death of Yasser Abdullah Abdo Maqbel al-Huboub, the head of the investigation department in al-Maghlaf district of Hodeidah Governorate, as a result of being shot three times in the chest. Three of their members were also injured: Hafiz Hassan Muhammad Marjan Bara, Hamdi Ahmed Ahmed Ibrahim, and Ammar Ahmed Yahya Hussein Ammar. The Houthis in a statement indicated that the armed man, Ali Mahdi Ali Hafdi, resisted the Houthi raid on his house and fought until his death.

The resistance act carried out by Mahdi Hafdi in Hodeidah is not the first of its kind, but rather preceded by a series of other individual armed resistance operations that resulted in the deaths of Houthi fighters, including senior members.

On May 12th, a man named Muhammad Sadeq al-Sanawi bravely resisted a Houthi campaign led by the newly appointed director of security in Mawiah district, known as “Abu al-Dhahab,” who stormed the Sharman area of al-Kharaba district with the aim of arresting or killing him. However, al-Sanawi fought back, killing eight of them and injuring more than ten, before being killed along with two others. According to a military source, al-Sanawi was a former prisoner of the Houthi militia.

In February, two brothers named Saddam al-Tawwil and his brother resisted a Houthi military campaign in the Mitaim area of Ibb Governorate, led by a senior Houthi commander named Abu Tarq al-Nihmi, who commanded the rapid intervention force. The clashes between the brothers and the Houthi campaign resulted in the death of the Houthi commander Abu Tarq al-Nihmi and three of his members, in addition to Saddam and his brother, who fought until their death against the Houthi machinery of oppression.

The Houthis cannot abandon violence

The researcher Salman al-Maqrami in an extensive analysis of the escalating tribal protests against the Houthis. He stated that the movement relies on “principles of absolute obedience according to the teachings of Imamate in the Ja’fari Zaydi doctrine, which complicates their efforts to gain popular support or reach effective understandings with tribes. In contrast, the tribes reject this absolute Imami view, believing that demonstrations and protests are means of pressure and expression of rejection of any transgressions.”

Al-Maqrami added that the Houthis find “difficulty in managing their differences with tribes without resorting to force, which has widened the rift between them and tribal forces, including those who have provided the Houthi group with fighters. What is new is that we are now seeing protests that have gone beyond tribal demands related to the economic situation to demands for more comprehensive political changes that could fundamentally threaten the future of the group’s rule or exacerbate the conflict between the tribes and the Houthis to dangerous levels.”

 Exhaustive attacks threaten the entity of the group and its rule

The armed attacks against the Houthis, who use “brutality” and “violence” to confront tribal anger and consolidate their authority in their controlled areas while rejection of their continued administration of state institutions grows, have led the Houthi leadership to sense real dangers to its stability and security grip.

The armed movement was able to control the tribes during the past years of war through a mixture of threats of destruction and appeasement, especially with what are known as Sana’a belt tribes. And amid the Houthis’ fear of changing their neutrality or loyalty to them in favor of the internationally recognized government, anger against the group’s rule has been simmering and rising over time.

A prominent tribal sheikh in Dhamar Governorate told Yemen Monitor, “We don’t want the government in Aden, but we don’t want the Houthis either. We’ve tried their administration and authority for nine years. The experience of the tried is an insult to all tribal sheikhs.”

The tribal sheikh predicted that resistance against the Houthis would continue, saying, “They have not provided anything for the people, and they have continued to confiscate their money, villages, and taxes. They do not pay salaries, do not help the needy, and are not stopped by custom, or judgments, or there is no law except what the group’s supervisors decide.”

Houthi leader Muhammad al-Bukhiti commented on what happened in Rada’a in March, saying, “This particular timing is a dangerous indicator of the existence of many grievances that Ansar Allah must move quickly to resolve, before they lead the causes of victory to be dissipated.”

Houthi-affiliated and Iran-close member of the House of Representatives Ahmed Saif Hashad, who recently criticized the Houthi method of governance, wrote, “If a real change does not occur in the current system of governance in Sana’a after what happened in Rada’a, then I predict a great storm or a resurrection approaching.”

In the face of these attacks, informed Houthi sources revealed significant increases in the size of their funding. According to media leaks, the Houthi group increased the budget of its security elements in Rada’a from 120 million riyals in the old currency per month to 180 million riyals in April, only two weeks after the bombing of houses in Rada’a; and later raised it to 220 million riyals, with the deployment of a large number of its elements in the city.

The group also sent a financial reinforcement to its security supervisors in the northern and southern parts of Taiz (300 million riyals) outside the budget a few weeks after the incident of “al-Sanawi” in Mawiah district, where a Houthi campaign fought to the death in May.

Fears of Expanding Conflict

Unorganized resistance operations seem to be a problem that plagues the Houthis in the areas under their control, with the war with the internationally recognized government having halted under the April 2022 truce. As a result, the Houthis have resorted to more extreme security measures and political actions to target their supervisors who incite the anger of the population. The Houthis have established a new intelligence apparatus within the community called “general mobilization” to limit the war of attrition against them.

Journalist and researcher Adnan al-Jabrani, who has been monitoring the group’s behavior for years, said in a report, “Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has turned the task of his provincial supervisors into a mobilizational term and the executive council, which is the largest of the group’s councils, into a term called ‘mobilization office.’ All of these are internal organizational decisions as usual, and based on this, the group has allocated huge resources for mobilization at the level of every village, sub-district, and directorate in all the governorates controlled by the group in the north of the country, including the capital Sana’a… in the way of the Iranian Basij.”

Concurrently, the Houthi militia established another apparatus for monitoring its members, led by Ali Hussein al-Houthi (son of the founder of the Houthi group), according to informed sources.

According to the sources, the apparatus is called the Intelligence, Police, and Counterterrorism Apparatus, and it was equipped in the past few weeks and began implementing a series of kidnapping campaigns in Sana’a, including personas of their own supporters.

In mid-2023, sources told Yemen Monitor that the group launched an arrest campaign against hundreds of its officials and supervisors, who remained in prisons for several weeks and months. They were accused of financial corruption, murder, and various crimes. Most of them were recycled between governorates and positions, while a few were dismissed. The Houthis tried to silence the anger of the population and prevent the expansion of their area, but a year after this campaign, things returned to their previous state, and the anger of the population in the areas under their control did not escalate.

A second tribal sheikh from Amran told Yemen Monitor, “Nothing has changed with the presence of new supervisors. The people have changed, but the behavior remains the same. Taxes, provocations, and crimes of the group’s supervisors, as well as the confiscation of people’s farms and the management of border disputes between the lands and pastures of the tribes, have increased. Most of the time, they push them to fight and intervene to confiscate them and add them to their properties.”

Most of the sources in the report spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of Houthi retaliation.