By: Adnan Hashem
Iran lost its president and potential successor to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Sunday, May 19th, at the age of 85. The regime took a strong blow with the death of Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash along with Foreign Minister Hussein Amir Abdollahian.
Even before the official announcement of their death, condolence messages and attempts to offer assistance were coming from regional countries. Upon his death, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states sent condolence messages. High-ranking officials also traveled to Tehran to offer condolences, reflecting the regional consensus that Raisi and his foreign minister had sought. As for the Axis of Resistance; Syria and Lebanon declared three days of mourning, while the Houthis postponed their celebrations of Yemen’s unity for seven days.
Their death should not change the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in the region; neither in its support for allies in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, nor in its desire to maintain agreements with Gulf countries.
Amplifying messages from the “Axis of Resistance” highlighting the role of two men who played a significant part in Iran’s expansionist policy goes beyond mere condolences. It signifies respect for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the real decision-maker in Iran, who has lost two of his most loyal and dedicated men within the country, carefully groomed as potential successors to the position of Supreme Leader and President. As Raisi and Abdollahian are the most staunchly ideologues, aligned with the Supreme Leader’s vision regarding the Axis of Resistance, empowering the Revolutionary Guard Corps domestically, and the foreign operations of Al-Quds Force under his direct command.
There is no doubt that the regime’s self-imposed hardline approach to export the revolution will remain unchanged, operating in a vacuum that allows for nothing but self-perpetuation. This vacuum leaves Iranians feeling increasingly excluded. Over the past few years, those labeled as reformists who differ in their approach to managing external conflicts and the powers of the Revolutionary Guard Corps have been sidelined in favor of the hardline faction. Most of those in the circle of power with Raisi share similar views on governance and exporting the revolution.
The notion that the executive branch (presidency and government) does not influence Iran’s policies due to the presence of the Supreme Leader is shortsighted. During the presidency of former President Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian nuclear deal was reached despite hardline opposition, and enriched uranium production declined. Under Raisi’s presidency, negotiations between the US and Iran in Oman were discussing the regional situation and Iran’s nuclear program when enrichment reached record levels.
President Ebrahim Raisi and Amir Abdollahian were in agreement on regional issues, with Raisi being the most aligned president with the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Supreme Leader’s policies in decades. The Houthis themselves felt this shift between their meetings with former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Abdollahian, as the latter was more in line with them and adopted their “point of view” more than his predecessor, according to a Houthi leader familiar with the details.
It is certain that the top leadership in Iran will find itself more preoccupied with the task of ensuring a smooth transition to a new president and the early elections scheduled for June 28. It would not be surprising to see Iran tense, both in its foreign stance and domestic politics, and it may become more dangerous if it perceives itself as being on the defensive position.
Until the transition is complete, domestic and foreign policies, including Iran’s policy towards the “Axis of Resistance,” will continue. The current officials reflect the Supreme Leader’s inner circle, including Acting President Mohammad Mokhber and Acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri, a practiced negotiator and one of the Supreme Leader’s closest critics, as Khamenei’s daughter is Bagheri’s brother’s wife.
Therefore, it is not immediately clear whether these two deaths will have dire consequences for Iran’s foreign relations, until it is known who will officially succeed them. The situation will also not change for the Axis of Resistance, whose members will remain on alert with Iran preoccupied with consolidating internal power and worried about being targeted externally.
Iran is facing increasing internal threats as tensions continue since the killing of the young woman Mahsa Amini in 2022 and the attacks claimed by ISIS at the beginning of the year, poor economic conditions, and a political crisis. The Supreme Leader’s regime is seeking to strengthen ideological consensus and political control over the expense of losing more of its legitimacy.
External threats have escalated since the Israeli airstrike on Gaza Strip, the killing of Revolutionary Guard commanders in an Israeli airstrike on the embassy in Damascus, Iran’s first direct response to the Israeli occupation last month, and the Western buildup of warships in the Red Sea. Unpredictability has become the norm between Iran and its adversaries, with all the risks of misreading each other’s intentions.
Iran’s tension, anger, and internal unrest can only mean instability for the region. Continuing on this path will surely not keep the Middle East in the crossfire, and will push the Iranian regime to seek nuclear weapons, seen as a life insurance policy, which will encourage Iran’s neighbors to enter an arms race to reach equivalent weapons, increasing the risk of regional insecurity.
Iran’s continued anxiety under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategy is increasing support for the “Axis of Resistance,” which is already causing growing national security concerns for the region’s countries, especially in light of the international buildup of weapons and warships in waters close to Iran and its allies in the Axis of Resistance.
