by Marwan Al-Ghafouri
There exists a cautious balance between the gains of the three states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It is unlikely that a significant, immediate change will occur to this tripartite map. Fragmented states do not survive by luck, and prolonged wars that end in ceasefires, often due to exhaustion, return, if at all, in a political rather than a military form, merely as a maneuver. Similar to what happened in Germany after World War II, four countries retained their gains from German territory: “Russian”, “American”, “French”, and “British” Germany. These cautious balances persisted until the entire global system changed, a period of over forty years. More than a decade ago [after 20 years of German reunification], tour guides would tell us on buses touring Berlin, “We are now leaving Russian Berlin and entering American Berlin.”
All of Yemen’s cards are now in foreign hands. We recall a joke that was told to us two years ago. At that time, men and women went to Riyadh to discuss the affairs of their country. The photos taken of them, seated at their tables, writing their momentous notes, were reassuring. They went to sleep, as any expatriate would, with brilliant ideas in their minds that they would write down the next day. They woke up to a new president, and have not yet been able to see their old president. The new president was a “decision” made by officers from the two states and approved by the politicians of both countries. As a man with a doctorate, intelligence, and experience, he knows his presidential duty: to guard the gains of the three states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE )and to recognize the fragmentation. The three states do not want another hybrid war. There is ample room for maneuvering, quarreling, and even for brandishing war. But there is no place for war. Each state has defined an “unacceptable” level in its own part. US, the only player outside the trio, has accepted the game, in fact, it wanted it. The fascist regime in Sana’a represents a winning card for the US, through which it can lead Saudi Arabia in any direction it wants. And the Emirati occupation of the southern lands represents an Israeli – and necessarily American – interest, especially regarding influence over the seas, islands, and international waters.
Iranian Missiles in Sanaa Enable US Influence Over Saudi Policy ,David Rothkopf’s compelling article in Foreign Policy (also the economic editor of Haaretz) on “Why Arab States Haven’t Cut Ties with Israel” reveals a strategic calculus at play. He argues that Saudi Arabia, desperate for US support in acquiring a nuclear infrastructure and for broader protection against Iran and its proxies, has allowed itself to be manipulated. By maintaining the Iranian threat, the US can leverage Saudi Arabia’s dependence, even pushing it towards normalization with Israel. The pressure from the “Shiite world” has forced Saudi Arabia into a precarious position. This pressure must continue to prevent Saudi Arabia from assuming an independent stance on the changing international stage, especially as Iran integrates further into the Russian-Chinese axis.
Yemen, a country under occupation, has lost all its cards to external powers. Generations will likely live under this fate. The most that can be achieved now, through domestic efforts or external agreements, is an “improvement in the lives of Yemenis.” This could involve opening roads, facilitating port traffic, reopening airports, medical and relief missions, perhaps even attempting to unify the currency, and other logistical rather than political measures. It’s a similar situation to what is often said about Palestine: improving the lives of Yemenis does not, in any way, empower them to have a unified state or sovereignty over their own land.
Behind the scenes, politicians are playing bureaucratic roles that serve the interests and agreements of the colonial powers. While Iran may have agreed to halt attacks on Marib as part of its efforts to build bridges with the Gulf, it will not accept a change in the rules of engagement such as a siege of Sanaa. Saudi Arabia will be compelled to return to respecting these rules of engagement, as it does in the south with its other adversary, the UAE. The UAE has imposed a veto on oil exports from its southern colonies, and Saudi Arabia has no choice but to respect this veto. A balance must be struck between the interests of the three colonial powers: calming and stabilizing the Yemeni file so that the “three sisters” can turn their attention elsewhere.
The central bank maneuver and the subsequent Houthi threats will lead to some sort of settlement, a return to the rules of engagement agreed upon by the three countries. It is unlikely that the Yemeni colonies will witness any significant change in the coming years. This would not be possible without major changes that shake the global system and redraw the map of influence, power, and poles.
